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Abstract
This paper questions the positive relationship between HIV prevalence
and income in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, we hypothesize that a
greater economic instability would reduce the incentives to engage in self-
protective behaviors inducing people to increasingly take the risk of HIV-
infection and hence causing a rise in HIV prevalence. We provide a simple
model to stress on the effects of an increase in income risk in the incen-
tives for protection. We test the prediction using a panel of Sub-Saharan
African countries over the period 1980-2001. It is shown that the epidemic
is widespread in countries that experience a great macroeconomic instabil-
ity over the whole period. When introducing income instability, wealth is
devoid of predictive power and the puzzle of the positive relationship be-
tween income and prevalence in Africa is lifted. Additional finding states
that the risk taking of HIV-infection increases when the individuals are
facing frequent and large crop shocks.
1 Introduction
The HIV/AIDS epidemic exhibits complex patterns because worldwide, the epi-
demic hits mostly the poorest countries while within Sub-Saharan Africa, the
epidemic affects mainly the richest ones. 0.8% of the global adult population
was living with HIV/AIDS in 2001 (UNAIDS 2007). This average prevalence
was not reached in the two richest regions since in Western and Central Europe
and in North America, 0.2% and 0.6% of the adult population were HIV-infected
respectively. But the levels of prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa clearly exceed
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Riccardo Faini Doctoral Conference on Development Economics for valuable comments.
1
the global estimate since there, the average prevalence reached 9.44% in 2001.
Concerning the flow of new infections, one estimates that in 2004, over the 4.9
millions of new contaminations, more than 95% occur in low and middle-income
countries (UNAIDS 2004). By contrast, a close look at the spread of the epi-
demic within Sub-Saharan Africa reveals that the richest regions are the most
hit by the epidemic. Indeed, in 2001, Southern Africa was the most affected re-
gion with 23.5% of the adult people living with HIV/AIDS, followed by Central
Africa with 7.20%, East Africa with 5.11% and lastly West Africa with 4.30%
of its adult population infected.
A series of studies documents the sensitivity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic
to income at both macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, macroeconomic evidence claims that the national HIV prevalence levels
increase with wealth (Bloom, Mahal and Sevilla 2001; Clark and Vencatachel-
lum 2003; Lachaud 2007). In a couple of African countries, empirical works
suggest that rich individuals are more likely to be HIV-infected or to engage in
risky sexual behaviors than their counterparts (Kazianga 2004; de Walque 2006;
Lachaud 2007). Traditional literature related with the investment in health sug-
gests that the investment increases with the income level while in the particular
case of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa, things go on the opposite direction.
People adopt risky attitudes that reduce their human capital as their income
increases. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the relation between epidemic and income
is puzzling. Clark and Vencatachellum (2003) propose to solve this apparently
counter-intuitive relation for the industrialized countries within Sub-Saharan
Africa.
By contrast, this paper introduces the economic uncertainty to complete the
puzzle. In Africa, the widespread instability and the lack of protection against
the occurrence of exogenous risks and against their negative consequences might
influence the individual choice and attitudes toward the risk of infection, and
namely, might reduce the value people grant to the risk of infection. Here we
focus on the risky sexual behaviors but any investment in health and human
capital might be influenced by the widespread instability of the revenues. It is
worth thinking of some recent cases in which people lost all they owned from
day to day as in the conflict outbreak in Coˆte d’Ivoire and in Darfour or as in
the wave of expropriation undertaken in Zimbabwe. Without referring to such
extreme cases, agriculture is the dominant economic activity in most African
countries. Once a farmer planted his crop, he is waiting for harvest and is
able to anticipate how good the harvest will be in the following months. If he
experiences a drought, a damaging rainfall variation or even a locust invasion,
he knows that his harvest will be bad and the prospects to sell it on the market
or to stock it in his granary are thin. In such a context where the priority is to
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satisfy the primary needs, an individual who usually opts for safe sex may engage
in unsafe sex one day either ex-post or ex-ante a risk on his own income. More
broadly, living in a country of high economic instability does not encourage the
agent to adopt safe sexual behaviors because it is not sure that in the future, he
will be in good living conditions. A similar desincentive mechanism operates for
the employee who has to exert much effort to get promoted in the sense that if
the exogenous probability that his firm will go bankrupt in the following period
is high, he has no incentive to exert any effort. In the context of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, the reasoning is the same, why should people engage in safer sexual
practices to be sure to live longer and healthy when they are not sure that they
will live in good conditions? Anticipating exciting future prospects will on the
contrary encourage them to invest in self-protection. The bottom line of the
paper is to argue that individuals must face so many risks in their everyday life
that actually they do not care to take one additional and deliberated risk. We
argue that whether the economic shock is anticipated or contemporaneous to
the decision, the bottom line is maintained.
In this vein, we question the positive relationship between HIV prevalence
and income in Sub-Saharan Africa and test the incidence of the aggregate eco-
nomic risks faced by the individuals on their choice between safe and unsafe
sex and hence on the spread of the epidemic. These interactions have not yet
been explored in the literature and provide a potential explanation for the low
incentives to opt for safer behaviors in Sub-Saharan Africa. We propose a sim-
ple model of individual choice under the HIV/AIDS epidemic to gain insights
about the mechanisms at stake. The prediction derived from the model is that
for a given average income, an increase in the income risk reduces the incentives
to choose self-protection. Empirical findings validate this prediction. Using a
panel data of Sub-Saharan African countries over the last two decades, results
suggest that the volatility in gross domestic product influences the spread of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The more unstable the economies, the highest are
the levels of prevalence. We uncover that the instability of GDP per capita
has distinguishable effects according to the income group. Extracting the cycli-
cal component of the GDP shows that taken alone the income may lead to a
spurious relation between income and prevalence in the sense that it includes
both the trend and the fluctuations. When introducing the measure of GDP
instability, GDP is devoid of its predictive power and the puzzle is lifted. The
effect of crop shocks on the spread of the epidemic is analyzed as an extension
and confirms the benchmark results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background of
the problem and develops a model of individual choice between safe and un-
safe sex to highlight how income uncertainty alters the incentives to invest in
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self-protection. This theoretical framework aims to shed some light on the mi-
croeconomic foundations that are behind our empirical investigations. Section
3 presents the indicator of economic instability and discusses the econometric
issues. The extend of economic instability in Sub-Saharan Africa will be dis-
cussed and related to HIV prevalence. Section 4 provides and comments the
empirical results. It is shown how the puzzle of the positive relation between
income and HIV prevalence is lifted and how the instability in national revenue
influences the spread of the epidemic. Some robustness checks are also pro-
posed in this section to to rule out the possibility that other mechanisms drive
the significant and positive relation between income risk and the spread of the
epidemic. Lastly, the framework is applied to crop shocks that are found to
enhance the HIV prevalence. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Economic Rationale
2.1 Background
A branch of the literature on the HIV/AIDS epidemic explores the relation be-
tween the level of the epidemic and wealth. Focusing on 60 developing countries,
Bonnel (2000) finds a positive but not statistically significant relation between
HIV prevalence and the growth in GDP per capita. Alvarez, Li and Zanakis
(2007) provide evidence on the socio-economic determinants of the epidemic in
151 countries and show that the number of adults 15/49 living with HIV/AIDS
and the number of AIDS-related death for adults and children are both posi-
tively related to the gross national product.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, macroeconomic evidence claims that the national
HIV prevalence levels increase with wealth (Bloom et al 2001; Clark and Ven-
catachellum 2003; Lachaud 2007). At the regional level, Lachaud (2007) finds
that the disparities across regions within a country like Burkina Faso are linked
to the living standards and demonstrates that the level of regional prevalence
increases with wealth whatever the proxy used. To corroborate macroeconomic
findings, microeconomic evidence suggests that in a couple of African countries,
rich individuals are more likely to be HIV-infected than their counterparts.
Lachaud (2007) provides a detailed study of the determinants of HIV-infection
in Burkina Faso. Using the Demographic and Health Survey made in 2003, he
shows that the probability of being HIV-infected increases with non monetary
welfare. Proposing an index of physical assets and decomposing the households
by wealth levels into three groups, it appears that the probability of infection
is higher for the individuals whose household belongs to the intermediate group
and even higher for those belonging to the richest 20th percentile compared to
the poor. In addition, the predicted HIV prevalence varies from 1.2% to 2.9%
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for the very poor and the rich respectively. Distinguishing men and women, de
Walque (2006) does not confirm the positive relation found in the case of Burk-
ina Faso but he validates this pattern in Cameroon for both males and females
and in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania where the rich women are more likely to be
infected than the poor ones.
One would wonder whether this positive relationship between wealth and
prevalence is counter-intuitive. At least, two opposite effects of wealth are at
play at the individual level. On one hand, it is documented that in Sub-Saharan
Africa, beyond the transactions with commercial sex workers, money and gifts
are driving most extramarital or casual sex. Accordingly, it is straightforward
that a poor man can not afford having as many girlfriends as a rich man. A rich
man seems more vulnerable due to his potentially extended sexual network. The
role of transfers is all the more crucial that Luke (2006) points out a negative
relationship between transfers and condom use in informal relationships in urban
Kenya. Kazianga (2004) demonstrates that the demand for casual sex increases
with wealth for urban men in Burkina Faso and rural men in Guinea and Mali.
On the other hand, even if rich agents have an extended sexual network, they
have always the choice between safe and unsafe sex and they could use condoms
with their multiple partners. Their relative wealth confers them the ability to
buy condoms and to negotiate its use.
Clark and Vencatachellum (2003) solve theoretically this apparently counter-
intuitive positive relationship in a two-period model in which the utility of the
agents in the second period is a function of their wage which directly depends
on the productivity of their colleagues. There the expected share of the popula-
tion opting for unprotected sex determines the choice between safe and unsafe
sex because this share has an impact on one’s earnings tomorrow through the
fall in productivity due to infection. Anticipating that most colleagues adopt
risky sexual practices in the first period and will be HIV-infected in the second
one reduces the incentives to take care individually. Their approach rationalizes
the risk taking in the industrialized countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The ap-
proach proposed in this paper to solve the puzzle is more general than in Clark
and Vencatachellum (2003) in the sense that it applies to any African countries
whatever the predominant productive sector of their economy.
2.2 A model of choice between safe and unsafe sex: the
setting
The whole sexually active population is normalized to 1. Nature makes the
first move, such that before the decision making, some people are already HIV-
infected due to their historical sexual behaviors that are not modeled here. The
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initial level of prevalence in the country is equal to 1−ρ. Likewise, the population
is composed of 1 − ρ infected agents and ρ susceptible agents, assuming that
they are aware of their status. The serostatus conditions the behaviors of the
individuals when choosing between safe and unsafe sex because infected and
susceptible agents do not share the same incentives for protection, and because
without possibility of recovering, they do not have the same utility functions.
This baseline setting focuses on the sexual behavior of the susceptible group
because it constitutes the very population at risk of infection and assumes that
all infected individuals are opting for unsafe sex 1.
In the first period, the susceptibles choose between engaging in a protected
or unprotected sexual intercourse. Those opting for unsafe sex take the risk of
becoming infected in the second period while those opting for condom use will
remain susceptible for sure. The risk of infection is characterized as follows. A
susceptible gets infected if he or she encounters a HIV-infected partner and if the
virus is transmitted. The agent is assumed to choose his or her sexual partner
randomly such that the probability of having an infected partner is equal to the
proportion of people living with HIV2. This assumption on the random choice
of partner is determinant in the sense that the risk of infection is higher if the
agent chooses his partner exclusively among commercial sex workers or lower
if the agent is a young man who has sex only with girls from his age cohort.
We also assume perfect matching in the sense that people opting for unsafe sex
match all together. During a unprotected sexual intercourse, the transmission
rate is β. Likewise, when having a unsafe sexual intercourse, the probability of
becoming infected is (1− ρ)β and the probability of remaining susceptible is
1− (1− ρ)β. As in Geoffard and Philipson (1996), we assume that the newly
infected agents are still alive in the next period. We assume no discount factor.
Concerning the payoffs, we propose a state dependent utility approach in
which the utilities the agents get depend directly on their own status. The
agents derive utility from the consumption of their income, w. Two cases are
explored. First, we analyze the incentives to engage in risky behavior when the
level of income is certain in the second period. Second, we introduce income
uncertainty to characterize the condition under which the agent starts engaging
in self-protective behaviors. As developed in the introduction, the bottom line
1This assumption simplifies our calculations and does not diminish the insights to be drawn
from the results. Relaxing this assumption leads to more risk taking because with a proportion
of infected agents engaging in safe sex, the probability of encountering an infected partner
through exposure and hence the probability of contracting AIDS fall. A negative feedback of
altruism among infected agents would emerge.
2Formally, the probability of encountering an infected partner is equal to the share of
HIV-infected agents among the people engaged in unsafe sex. The latter encompasses the
infected agents and the proportion of susceptible agents who are risk takers. Likewise this
probability is endogenous and depends on the expected share of risk takers among healthy
agents. However, we argue that the number of agents engaging in unsafe sex whatever their
serostatus is approximated by 1.
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is that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the instability in the living conditions and hence,
the uncertainty about the future state of the world might reduce the incentives
to invest in protection against the risk of HIV-infection. This intuition will be
confirmed by the theoretical framework and later by the empirical analysis.
2.3 Case 1: Decision without uncertainty on future in-
come
The agent gets a utility denoted u(w) when susceptible and v(w) = αu(w) when
in bad health, where 0 ≤ α < 1, as in Viscusi and Evans (1990). u(.) is assumed
to be continuous, increasing and concave. This formulation of the utility func-
tion in bad health is grounded on the reality and captures the negative effects
of contracting HIV on everyday life. Note that the risk takers derive an extra-
utility from unprotected sex denoted by ∆. This instantaneous benefit from
unsafe sex is a standard assumption in the literature on individual choice in the
presence of HIV/AIDS (Geoffard and Philipson 1996; Clark and Vencatachel-
lum 2003). Accordingly, choosing protection p brings the agent EUs,p = u(w)
and choosing exposure e EUs,e = ∆ + (1− ρ)βv(w)+ [1− (1− ρ)β]u(w).
The susceptible is maximizing his expected utility, such that the decision
rule is the following. The susceptible individual
• uses condoms if EUs,p ≥ EUs,e;
• engages in unsafe sex if EUs,p < EUs,e.
Lemma 1: When all HIV-infected agents are assumed to have unprotected
sexual intercourse, the susceptible individual:
1. prefers safe sex if the following condition holds:
β (1− ρ) (1− α)u(w)−∆ ≥ 0 (1)
2. takes the risk of becoming HIV-infected otherwise.
Proof. The expressions get in proposition 1 are derived from the decision rule
described above by substituting for EUs,p and EUs,e.
This condition means that the individual is willing to adopt risky sexual
behaviors if the net benefit from unsafe sex exceeds the net expected utility
of self-protective behavior. As in Geoffard and Philipson (1996) and Philipson
(2000), the individual remains exposed as long as the current benefit from un-
protected sex outweights the expected loss in the future utility due to infection.
However unlike their model, the key element here is the distribution of future
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income instead of the reservation prevalence levels, as developed in the next
subsection.
From condition (1), every individual with a utility level higher than the
threshold ∆β(1−ρ)(1−α) (denoted Ω hereafter) engages in safe sex while those
with a lower utility opt for unsafe sex. This cutting value is determinant and is
a function of the instantaneous benefit from unsafe sex, the loss in utility due
to infection and the probability of getting infected. Deriving Ω indicates that
a decrease in the utility loss, in the HIV prevalence or in the transmission rate
leads to an increase in the threshold that induces more risk taking.
Concerning the loss in utility due to infection, note that our results do not
promote the coverage of the antiretroviral therapy or the sensitization cam-
paigns whose messages would underestimate the negative effects of infection on
well-being. From our modelling, one additional key result is that reducing the
probability of HIV transmission is not efficient to prevent people from taking the
risk of infection. Indeed, as having an uncured sexually transmitted infection
(STI) increases the probability of getting HIV-infected from having unsafe sex
with an infected partner, one way to reduce the transmission rate β could be to
subsidize the STI treatment. Although Oster (2005) shows that if Sub-Saharan
Africa exhibited a prevalence to STIs equal to that of USA, the HIV prevalence
would be very low, here we found that reducing β through the treatment of
STIs boosts the risk taking. Curing STIs is not sufficient. The very issue is to
provide more incentives to use condom to prevent from contracting any STIs
including HIV.
The other parameters ∆ and (1−ρ) influence the choice between protection
and exposure. Likewise, if the instantaneous benefit increases, people will get
more incentives to engage in unsafe sex and more people will take the risk of
HIV-infection. As in Philipson and Posner (1993) and Geoffard and Philipson
(1996), we found that an increase in the HIV prevalence will increase the fear
of being contaminated and will induce people to start adopting self-protective
measures. This result will be confirmed in the empirical investigation since we
find that when the epidemic has become generalized in the country since a long
period of time, the growth in prevalence is diminishing.
In the case where the level of income is certain in the second period, deriving
condition (1) with respect to the average income, we found that β (1− ρ) (1 −
α)u′(w) ≥ 0 given that the utility function u(.) is increasing. An increase in
income shifts the condition upwards.
Proposition 1: Assuming an increasing utility function, an increase in the
average income leads to a rise in self-protective behaviors.
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We found out that an increase in income leads to more protection. How-
ever this theoretical prediction is not confirmed by the empirical literature on
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa where the relation between
HIV/AIDS and income is shown to be positive. A puzzle emerges. We aim
to disentangle this puzzle by introducing a risk on income. Contrary to Eeck-
houdt, Godfroid and Marchand (1998), we introduce aversion toward the income
risk in the decision about self-protection arguing that in Sub-Saharan Africa,
most individuals are vulnerable to variation in income and to macroeconomic
instability. Indeed, if the economic activity is morose and leads to layoffs, the
agents do not receive any unemployment benefit. In the same way, in case
of bad harvest, the African countries do not develop any insurance system as
the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe that insures the agents against bad
climatic conditions and provides them substituting income if needed.
2.4 Case 2: Decision under income uncertainty
In the second case, the income is no more known for sure, but it is a random
variable denoted w˜ that follows a given cumulative distribution function F on
a support [w;w].
Introducing income uncertainty, the expected utilities get in the second
period are reformulated. The expected utility of income is denoted EU(w˜).
When the agent uses a condom, he gets EUs,p = EU(w˜) and faces only the
exogenous risk on income. On the contrary, when he opts for risky sex, he
faces both the risk of infection and the exogenous risk, and hence he gets
EUs,e = ∆+(1− ρ)βEV (w˜)+ [1− (1− ρ)β]EU(w˜), where EV (w˜) = αEU(w˜).
Applying the same decision rule as above leads to Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: Under income uncertainty, when all HIV-infected agents are
assumed to have unprotected sexual intercourse, the susceptible individual :
1. prefers safe sex if the following condition holds:
β (1− ρ) (1− α)EU(w˜)−∆ ≥ 0 (2)
2. takes the risk of becoming HIV-infected otherwise.
Certainty vs. Uncertainty To compare the incentives for self-protection
with and without income uncertainty, assume that E(w˜) = w. It follows that
u [E(w˜)] = u(w). From the Jensen’s inequality, whatever the random variable w˜,
if u(.) is concave, EU(w˜) < u [E(w˜)]. This inequality means that a risk averse
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agent never prefers a random variable to its mean. Since Lemma 1 states that
the susceptibles are risk takers if u(w) < ∆β(1−ρ)(1−α) and since EU(w˜) < u(w),
we obtain that EU(w˜) < u(w) < ∆β(1−ρ)(1−α) . It suggests that there is more
risk taking under income uncertainty because it is more likely that the expected
utility is below the threshold.
Increased Uncertainty Of more interest in the present context is the effect
of increased uncertainty surrounding income on the risk taking of HIV-infection.
To analyze this effect, we examine the consequence of a mean-preserving spread
of the distribution of income of the type proposed in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970). A mean preserving spread on the random variable w˜ has the following
effect on condition (2) β (1− ρ) (1 − α)EU ′′(w˜). This effect is negative given
that the utility function is concave. A rise in income risk shifts downwards the
condition.
Proposition 2: For a given average income, an increase in the income
risk reduces the incentives to choose protection. In other words, the higher the
income uncertainty, the higher is the risk taking of HIV-infection and hence the
more rapid is the spread of HIV in the country.
Consider the illustrative case of two countries that have a similar average
national income, E(w˜1) = E(w˜2), but different levels of economic uncertainty
such that the income is riskier in country 2 than in country 1 (i.e. w˜2 = w˜1 + x˜
with x˜ having zero mean and a positive variance). Our model predicts that with
the same values of the parameters, there would be more risk taking and hence
a higher prevalence in country 2 than in country 1. Proposition 2 shows that
controlling for income, the incentives for investing in self-protection decrease
with income volatility. Note that the income risk is independent of the income
level in the model and hence, to test this proposition empirically, our measure
of income instability should be independent of the income level.
Note that we keep this model as simple as possible in order to stress on how
income risk may influence the incentives to invest in self-protective behaviors.
There is room for extending the model by introducing heterogeneity, particularly
in terms of infection costs. Infection costs are likely to vary from one country to
another especially due to heterogeneous access to health care facilities. In such
a case, only the threshold will change and the prediction will be maintained. In
the empirical work, such a heterogeneity will be taken into account through the
rate of urban population in the sense that the agents living in urban areas are
likely to have a better access to health care than their rural counterparts. Other
control variables could have been the number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants,
the percentage of GDP devoted to the health sector but these alternatives are
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ruled out due to data availability and multicollinearity issues since the relation
of interest here is between national income and HIV prevalence.
2.5 Illustration
Using data, a direct illustration of Proposition 2 consists in comparing the distri-
bution of the gross domestic product per capita and the spread of the epidemic
for countries with a similar average revenue. Take Gambia and Burundi. Their
average income over the period 1980-2001 is about 895 dollars, but the distri-
bution of their GDP is different. For Gambia, the distribution is concentrated
around the mean value while in Burundi the variance is much higher as depicted
in Fig 1. At the same time, the epidemic in the two countries follow distinct
patterns. In Gambia, the spread of the epidemic is slow, the average prevalence
over the period 1980-2001 is 1.12% while its peak reached 2.27% of the adult
population infected in 2000. On the other hand, the epidemic is widespread in
Burundi with a prevalence level of 7.47% on average over the last two decades
and with a peak reaching 10.25% in 1992. According to Proposition 2, if both
countries have similar transmission rate, similar disutility from protection and
similar cost of infection, the higher income risk in Burundi explains why the
propagation of the epidemic was faster in Burundi than in Gambia.
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Figure 1: Distribution in GDP p.c.
Fig. A and B, in the Appendix, depict the distributions of the GDP per
capita for a couple of African countries. Comparing Congo and Guinea leads
to a similar illustration of Proposition 2 in the sense that Congo has a riskier
income and a more widespread epidemic than in Guinea. Similarly, Mozambique
and Nigeria have an equivalent constant GDP per capita but their distributions
of GDP per capita suggest that Mozambique is a much more volatile country in
terms of national revenues than is Nigeria. This stylized fact must be related
with the state of the epidemic. In Mozambique, the proportion of HIV-infected
individuals among the adult population is twice as big as in Nigeria. In 2001,
the prevalence reached 13% in Mozambique and 5.8% in Nigeria.
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This brief overview supports the mechanisms outlined in the section. To
properly test our prediction, we have collected data to constitute a panel of 43
countries3 over the period from 1980 to 2001. The countries are all the countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa except for the small countries for which HIV prevalence
is not reported by UNAIDS.
3 Dataset and Econometric Issues
3.1 Measurement of macroeconomic instability
Testing Proposition 2 requires to find out an appropriate measure of income
uncertainty in order to test whether it is a significant predictor of HIV preva-
lence controlling for income. We choose the Real Business Cycle methodology
to estimate the macroeconomic instability of the African economies and more
precisely, we apply the Hodrick Prescott filter to extract the cyclical compo-
nent of the Gross Domestic Product per capita. Hodrick and Prescott (1981)
allows to generate the non linear trend of the series. This trend stands for a
weighted average of the past, current and future values of the series and the
difference between the actual value of the variable and the trend is the cyclical
component. This measure of the cyclical component is a good indicator of the
annual shocks for several reasons. First, it is detrended in the sense that it is
independent of the mean of the series under consideration. For each country,
the mean of the cyclical component over the period is null. Second, taking into
account the historical and the future values of the series it avoids the drawback
of the standard coefficient of variation that considers only two periods and often
leads to spurious growth rate.
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Figure 2: Cyclical Component in GDP p.c.
Fig. 2 displays the annual fluctuations in per capita GDP for Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Mali and Zimbabwe. It illustrates the phenomenon for countries where the
3Due to missing values especially in the set of control variables, most of our estimations
include 39 or 40 countries.
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HIV/AIDS epidemic exhibits different patterns. Two noteworthy differences
are Mali and Zimbabwe. While Mali has one of the slowest HIV propagation in
Africa, Zimbabwe is hard-hit by the epidemic with a prevalence reaching 33.7%
of the adult population in 2001. As far as their respective economic instability,
the graph clearly shows that in Zimbabwe the fluctuations in GDP per capita are
greater and much more frequent than in Mali. Over the period 1980-2001, Zim-
babwe experienced frequent negative shocks of large magnitude. Coˆte d’Ivoire
illustrates an intermediate situation concerning both HIV dynamics and income
volatility.
As in Hodrick and Prescott (1981), the standard deviation of the cyclical
component is used as an index for the variability of the series Xit and we get
the following variable:
stdshockXi =
[
1
22
t=22∑
t=1
(Xit −HPtrendit)2
]1/2
(3)
The database covering 22 years, we benefit from a sufficiently long length
of time to get a consistent measure of the macroeconomic instability for each
country of the sample. The standard deviation of the annual deviations from
the trend should be viewed as a characteristic of the national economic volatil-
ity over time. The standard deviation of the shocks in GDP for each country
of the sample is summarized in Table 1a. A first look at the data suggests
that the countries which exhibit the highest variances are also those with the
highest levels of HIV prevalence. At the top of these variances in GDP, are
Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe which are also the worst-affected
countries. At the other extreme, Benin, Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Senegal
exhibit slightly volatile GDP per capita, given that in Madagascar the epidemic
is not yet generalized and that Senegal is known as a success story in preventing
the epidemic from spreading (Putzel 2006).
3.2 Econometric Model
We aim to figure out whether the agents incorporate the income instability in
their decision making about investing in self-protection. Since we have national
data rather than individual data, we test whether countries with highly un-
stable economy exhibit higher levels of HIV prevalence than those with stable
economy and we study whether decomposing the income series keeps positive
and significant the relation between wealth and HIV prevalence. Formally, we
test whether the growth in prevalence is increasing with economic instability.
The rate of HIV prevalence is predicted using UNAIDS data despite the con-
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troversy saying that their prevalence levels are overestimated compared to the
levels found in the Demographic and Health Surveys for two reasons. First, the
panel dimension of UNAIDS data brings more information and more variability
than do any cross sections and it enables us to control for individual unobserved
heterogeneity. Second, even if the overestimation was true, the prevalence lev-
els would be overestimated in the same way for each country of our sample
so that the comparability across countries and across time prevails even after
adjustment.
The existing macroeconometric evidence on the positive relationship between
the HIV/AIDS epidemic and wealth are confined in a static framework, certainly
due to the nature of the data. Alvarez et al (2007) and Lachaud (2007) estimate
their empirical models using cross sections of 45 regions in Burkina Faso and
151 countries respectively.
We estimate the HIV prevalence through a dynamic specification for two
reasons. First, since the level of prevalence at date t is a function of the stock of
HIV-infected agents who were contaminated before date t (i.e. the prevalence in
t− 1) and of the flow of newly contaminated agents, it is straightforward to de-
scribe the prevalence as a state dependent phenomenon. Second, the prevalence
rate reflects an aggregation of the individual behaviors in the extent to which
the higher the growth in HIV prevalence in a given year, the more numerous are
the agents who have undertaken risky sexual behaviors during that year since
UNAIDS provides the rate of prevalence at the end of the year. The economic
models on the rational epidemic of HIV/AIDS show that the agents decide on
whether to protect taking into account the probability of becoming infected
from a unprotected sexual intercourse and this probability depends directly on
the previous level of prevalence.
Note that a close look at the evolution of the epidemic over time suggests
nonlinearities in the prevalence. Indeed, the epidemic goes on increasing in
most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the first fifteen years of the epidemic
and after reaching a peak of HIV prevalence, the rate of growth diminishes.
To incorporate this nonlinearity, the standard dynamic model will be adapted
by including the lag of HIV prevalence both in levels and in squares in the
right-hand side of the equation.
3.3 Estimation strategy
The standard dynamic model is written:
yit = αi + ρyit−1 +X ′itβ + γt+ εit,∀i,∀t (4)
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where yit is the dependent variable, yit−1 its lag, Xit the set of covariates,
αi the individual-specific effect, t the time trend and εit the disturbances. We
choose the System-Generalized Method of Moments specification to estimate
(4) because the dynamic panel bias makes the estimation by Ordinary Least
Squares inefficient. The dynamic panel bias results from the correlation between
the fixed effect and the lagged dependent variable. Hence we need to eliminate
the αis. There are two alternatives depending on the transformation made on
the equation: Difference-GMM or System-GMM. Taking the first differences of
equation (4), we obtain:
∆yit = ρ∆yit−1 + ∆X ′itβ + γ∆t+ ∆εit,∀i,∀t (5)
where ∆yit = yit − yit−1. In equation (5), the correlation between ∆yit−1
and ∆εit requires the use of instrumental variables. In a panel data setting,
the time series dimension offers the lagged values of the regressors as poten-
tial candidates for the instruments. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose to use
∆yit−2 or yit−2 as instruments for ∆yit−1 and to estimate the model by the
instrumental variable method. Later, regarding the low efficiency of the Ander-
son Hsiao estimates, Arellano and Bond (1992) propose to estimate the model
by the Generalized Method of Moments rather than the IV technique, to ex-
tend the set of instrumental variables to the entire past values and took into
account the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations of the perturbations. This
technique is called the difference-GMM. The limitations of this approach are
substantial. One limitation is the loss of information due to the first differen-
tiation of the equation. Another is that the first differenced GMM estimator
suffers from downward bias and low precision, especially when the value of the
autoregressive coefficient ρ increases toward unity (Blundell and Bond 1998).
The alternative approach consists in using both the equations in levels and
in first differences in a system of equations. The advantages of the system-GMM
encompass the increase in precision and sample size, the ability of identifying
the time-invariant regressors, and that it behaves better than the difference
GMM for models where the autoregressive coefficient is high (Blundell, Bond
and Windmeijer 2000; Roodman 2006).
To adapt the standard dynamic model to our particular case, we introduce the
lag of HIV prevalence both in levels and in squares in the right-hand side as
follows.
HIVit = αi + ρ0HIVit−1 + ρ1HIV 2it−1 + β0Iit + β1IRit + C
′
itβ2 + γt+ εit (6)
where HIVit is the HIV prevalence, HIVit−1 its lag, Iit the income variable,
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IRit the measure of income risk, Cit the set of control variables, αi the country
specific effect, t the time effect and εit the disturbances.
Concerning the outcome variable, the System-GMM estimates the prevalence
rate in first differences that stands for the change in prevalence from one year to
another. Specifying the econometric model in a dynamic framework allows us
to predict the gross incidence rate by controlling for the lagged prevalence and
the estimated deaths due to AIDS. It does not deal with the net incidence rate
because we do not observe the HIV-infected agents who leave the stock for other
causes of mortality. A direct application of the system-GMM specification to
our econometric model requires the use of instruments for both the lag of HIV
prevalence and its squared value to correct for the correlation with the error
term.
The set of control variables includes the urbanization rate, the literacy rate,
religious indexes, ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, the number of years
since the epidemic became generalized and a rate of mortality due to AIDS (see
table 1b for data definition and sources). The role of the covariates is to deter-
mine, for any given level of past prevalence, what induces a massive risk taking
and hence, a more or less rapid propagation of HIV in the population.
3.4 Some Tests
First-of-all, before estimating the econometric model, panel unit root tests are
applied to avoid spurious regressions related to the presence of non stationary
variables in the left- or right-hand side of the equation. To examine the sta-
tionarity properties of the time-varying variables, we apply Levin, Lin and Chu
(2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root tests. More details
on these procedures and the results of the tests are displayed in Table 1c in
the appendix. When a variable is found to be integrated of order 1 and 2, we
introduce it respectively in first and second differences in the estimations.
In a system-GMM specification, consistent estimates require valid instru-
ments and homoskedastic and uncorrelated errors. We check for the validity of
the instruments through the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Hansen
test is used to ensure the absence of correlation between the instruments and
the disturbances of the model (Sevestre 2002). We correct for possible het-
eroskedasticity in the error terms and test for the autocorrelation of order 1 and
2 in the errors in first differences through the Arellano-Bond test.
Given the literature on the effects of the epidemic on the growth of the
African countries, we are particularly cautious with the potential endogeneity
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bias. Accordingly, we check for the endogeneity of the variable GDP through
the Hausman test. Formally each econometric model is estimated twice. One
estimation considers GDP per capita as exogenous and the other one as en-
dogenous and both estimations are compared in the test to know which one is
consistent. When the Hausman test is rejected, we use instruments to overcome
the simultaneity between income and HIV prevalence as suggested in Sevestre
(2002).
Lastly, to ensure that the shocks in GDP per capita and in yields are exoge-
nous, we check whether these shocks Granger cause the HIV prevalence. Table
1d displays the results from the tests. Results suggest that the rate of prevalence
does not Granger cause the contemporaneous shocks in yields and in GDP. This
rules out the possibility that the spread of AIDS are driving the large macroe-
conomic fluctuations that one country may experience. Concerning the gross
domestic product, it helps in predicting the prevalence while the prevalence does
not provide information to predict GDP per capita. In addition, when regress-
ing the cyclical components on the prevalence and the estimated death rate due
to AIDS, these regressors does not appear statistically significant.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Naive estimations: HIV prevalence and GDP
The objective of this subsection is to check whether our database provides a
positive relationship between income and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa, as
found in previous works. The naive estimation consists in excluding the measure
of GDP volatility from the econometric model and in testing whether a growth
in income per capita is associated with a growth in prevalence.
Since the variable gross domestic product per capita was found to be in-
tegrated of order 1, we can not introduce it in levels but in first differences.
Formally, we do not study the effect of the level of income but rather the ef-
fect of the growth in GDP or the level of enrichment of the country on HIV
prevalence. Starting with the GDP per capita in first differences, it is found
that an increase in the gross domestic product per capita leads to a rise in the
prevalence rate given the previous state of the epidemic (see columns 1 and 2
in Table 2). The more prosperous the country becomes, the more affected it is
by the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
As a robustness check, the next step consists in verifying whether the relation
still holds when using measures of wealth in level. Since the GDP per capita
is not stationary, proxies are required (see columns 3-5 in Table 2). The effect
of the level of GDP at the beginning of the period and that of the mean of
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the GDP per capita over 1980-2001 are estimated. Whatever the proxy used,
it is found out that richer countries exhibit a higher growth in prevalence. It
was worth making use of these proxies to ensure that the relation is robust,
but for the rest of the empirical work, the variable GDP per capita, even in
first differences, is favored because dealing with panel data, this time varying
variable provides more information about the countries’ standards of living.
Our database confirms previous findings and the following two subsections
are devoted to the empirical test of Proposition 2. Note that a particular atten-
tion is paid to the effect of the revenue on prevalence. To overcome the puzzle
detailed in sections 1 and 2, we should find that introducing the cyclical compo-
nent of GDP in standard deviation makes the positive relation between wealth
and prevalence disappear.
4.2 Prevalence, GDP and GDP instability: A test of our
prediction
Our prediction is supported by the data when introducing the standard de-
viations of the cyclical component of the GDP per capita. Table 3 displays
the benchmark estimation results from estimating equation (6). The estima-
tions suggest that the volatility in per capita GDP influences the dynamics of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. More volatile economies have
larger growth in HIV prevalence with other characteristics held constant. As
highlighted by the theoretical model proposed in Section 2, the microeconomic
foundations behind this macroeconometric result is that people living in coun-
tries that are historically volatile and prone to great and frequent fluctuations
in national income have less incentives to take care of their health status and
to invest in self-protection. In fact, whether they are infected or not, the indi-
viduals are not convinced that their living conditions will be improved in the
future, on the contrary, the likelihood of frequent variations in their living stan-
dards is dramatically high. We found that everything held constant, on average,
one standard deviation increase in the income instability leads to an increase in
prevalence of 0.2% per year or equivalently, of 4.4% at the end of the period.
Extracting the deviations from the trend shows that the variance plays a
role in explaining the growth in prevalence and that the GDP per capita is not
a good predictor for prevalence anymore. It is worth decomposing the series
so as to state that the average level of income is not sufficient and taken alone
may lead to spurious and counter-intuitive results since it encompasses both the
trend and the fluctuation of the series.
To go deeper in analyzing the relationship between macroeconomic volatility
and HIV prevalence, we investigate whether the effect depends on the income
level. The objective is to figure out whether rich countries are more vulnerable
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to economic shocks or in other words, whether people living in rich countries
are more likely to engage in risky behaviors when facing fluctuating income
than do people in poorer countries. We classify our observations by income
group such that the low-income group encompasses countries from the first
quantile of per capita GDP, the middle-income group countries from the second
quantile and the high-income group countries from the highest quantile. To test
for heterogeneous effects, we interact the three dummy variables with income
volatility in the baseline dynamic model.
Applying a Wald test to know whether the coefficients are jointly equal to
zero suggests that the effect of macroeconomic instability on prevalence is sta-
tistically significant (see column 4 of Table 3). As found above, the pooled effect
of income risk is statistically different from zero, meaning that macroeconomic
instability has a broad impact on the path of the epidemic. A second Wald test
is applied in order to test whether the coefficients associated with each income
group are equal, the result is that the impact of economic instability on the HIV
prevalence varies by income group. The impact is not significant for low- and
middle-income countries while it is positive and statistically significant for the
high-income group. Richer countries are found to be more sensitive to macroe-
conomic uncertainty than their counterparts. These results provide a possible
explanation for the fact that in Sub-Saharan Africa, rich countries are the most
severely hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is suggested that the individuals
in rich countries are more vulnerable to fluctuations in revenue. One might
argue that instability turns out to have a significant effect on the prevalence in
rich countries because fluctuations are potentially larger there than in low- and
middle-income countries. But, we used Hodrick Prescott filter to get fluctua-
tions that are detrended to avoid this possibility. The non linear trend reflects
the evolution of the income series over time for each country and the fluctua-
tions are the deviations from this trend. Moreover the standard deviation of
the fluctuations encapsulates both their frequency and their size and there is no
reason why rich countries should exhibit more frequent fluctuations than their
counterparts.
In rich countries, one standard deviation increase in income risk leads to
a rise of prevalence of 0.16% per year on average and with other explanatory
variables held constant. In this estimation, GDP per capita is devoid of its
predictive power and the puzzle is lifted as expected. In brief, this analysis
by income group shows that the widespread levels of infection in rich African
countries are probably due to their vulnerability to economic instability rather
than to their level of economic development as such.
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4.3 Robustness checks
We proceed to some robustness checks to see whether the coefficient of the
volatility in GDP remains stable and significant after introducing additional
regressors in the benchmark equation. The objective is to rule out the possibility
that other mechanisms drive the significant and positive relation between income
risk and the spread of the epidemic.
The first three columns of Table 4 test whether the coefficient on the volatil-
ity in GDP remains stable and significant when controlling for openness. The
idea behind this inclusion of openness relies on two literatures and aims to elim-
inate the possibility that openness acts as a third variable which could be at the
origin of both the expansion of the epidemic and income volatility. Indeed, on
one hand, Oster (2008) suggests that the levels of exports are positively driving
the HIV incidence in Africa due to its resulting rise in mobility and on the other
hand, trade openness is known to induce external risk. Openness is likely to
enhance national macroeconomic instability and at the same time, is likely to
rise the prevalence such that the positive relationship between volatility and
HIV may appear only due to the omission of the variable openness. We test
this possibility with three measures of openness. Columns 1 and 2 estimate
the contemporaneous effects of openness on prevalence by introducing openness
in current terms and openness in constant terms in first differences since the
latter turns out to be a process integrated of order 1. The effect of the average
degree of openness over the period 1980-2001 is estimated in column 3 of Table
4. Our estimation results claim that the relation between HIV prevalence and
income instability is not a spurious relation that would have emerged from the
omission of the variable openness. Whatever the measure of openness included
in the regression, the association between the spread of the epidemic and GDP
volatility is still positive and significant and GDP per capita is still devoid of its
predictive power. Contemporaneous degree of openness does not influence the
HIV prevalence but the average degree does.
Column 4 checks for the possibility that experiencing armed conflict increases
income volatility that in turn boosts the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. We
introduce a dummy for armed conflict as control variable because a country
prone to armed conflicts is likely to be much more volatile than a peaceful
country. The variable is equal to 1 if the country is experiencing an armed
conflict in the given period of time and 0 otherwise. We do not distinguish
according to the duration of the conflict. What matters is that the country is
currently in conflict leading to two consequences. On one hand, the conflict
might make the economy of the country sluggish, leading to a fall in the income
level and a rise in the income volatility. On the other hand, the bleak prospects
due to being in conflict might induce people to engage more likely in risky sexual
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behaviors. If this scenario was validated by the data, we would get that income
instability is not significant anymore and that the likelihood of experiencing
an armed conflict is positively and significantly associated to HIV prevalence.
Actually, this scenario is not validated by the data. Conflicts are not driving
the relation of interest between income risk and the epidemic. Income risk is
still a good predictor of HIV prevalence and armed conflict appear negatively
related to the spread of the epidemic in the country. Possible explanations for
this negative contemporaneous association between conflict and prevalence are
that the conflict kills especially the agents who were already infected (military
and agents who engage in the battle because their infection makes them have
less to lose) and that the conflict reduces the mobility and the possibility to
have unsafe sex.
We argued that the macroeconomic volatility influences the spread of the
epidemic through a fall in the incentives to engage in self-protection. Another
channel through which the positive association between prevalence and macroe-
conomic volatility might have occurred is through the aid flows. Accordingly,
more stable countries are likely to receive a higher amount of aid flows com-
pared to unstable countries and these aid flows might be targeted or used by
the local government to fight the epidemic. If such a scenario prevails, then
stable economies are less affected by the epidemic thanks to the aid received
and the unstable nations are more affected by AIDS not due to the income risk
as such but due to its induced lack of resources. To rule out this possibility, we
introduce the contemporaneous amount of official development as control vari-
able. Column 5 and 6 in Table 4 show that the instability in GDP p.c. remains
significantly and positively related to HIV prevalence even after introducing the
total aid flows and the aid flows per capita respectively. Note that aid flows
are found to be exogenous in our specifications, the amount of aid is not allo-
cated in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Including mean values instead of
contemporaneous values leads to the same conclusions4.
As a general comment on the robustness checks, note that the regression
coefficients for the variable of interest are quite similar across specifications 1-6
since one standard deviation increase in income risk induces an annual rise of the
prevalence ranging from 0.162 to 0.22% on average, with other characteristics
held constant.
4.4 Extension
The role of crop shocks is explored as an extension of the model to see whether
the relation remains valid when another economic risk is considered. We in-
vestigated the role of instability in the gross domestic product to insert our
4Results are not reported here but are available from the author upon request.
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contribution to the existing literature on national income and prevalence, but
we may wonder whether the volatility in gross domestic product is the most
appropriate proxy for the volatility in individual wealth. GDP is an indicator
of standards of living and gives some information about the potential public
investment. However in most African countries, the majority of the population
is working on the fields while agriculture is not productive and hence, stands
for a thin part of the GDP. For instance, in Zambia, on average 75% of the
population is working in agriculture while the share of the agricultural sector
in GDP is only 19%. The remaining 81% come from other sources and their
profits do not benefit directly to the wide majority of the population. Farmers
have access to these resources only through public spending if they are used to
finance social programs but do not constitute individual wealth as such. This
example is representative of the situation in most countries within Sub-Saharan
Africa. In this context, investigating the role of the volatility in agricultural
yields provides some additional insights into the relationship between economic
instability and the spread of the epidemic. The volatility in agricultural yields
over the previous two decades is proxied by the standard deviation of its cyclical
component (see Table 1a).
Table 5 repeats the benchmark regressions replacing the volatility in GDP
by the volatility in yields as the independent variable of interest. The evi-
dence shows a positive association between the variance of the fluctuations in
yields and the prevalence. Countries in which the yields are highly volatile are
much more affected by the epidemic than their counterparts. High and frequent
crop shocks discourage people to invest in self-protective behaviors all the more
than in most countries, the vast majority of the population is working in the
agricultural sector, have no outside option to avoid crop shocks and whose liveli-
hoods are directly affected by these fluctuations in yields. GDP per capita is
still significantly and positively related to the prevalence. Contrary to previous
estimations, the effects of GDP per capita is not offset by the effects of the
economic volatility because here the volatility in yields is used instead of its
own volatility. However in Column 3, the standardized regression coefficient for
volatility in yields exceeds that for the income level meaning that a standard
deviation-change in yields instability has a greater impact on prevalence than
a standard deviation-change in GDP. An increase in one standard deviation in
yields instability and in GDP lead to a rise of 0.22% and 0.07% of the prevalence
respectively. To get the same change in prevalence as the change resulting from
a one-standard deviation change in yields instability, the GDP per capita must
increase by three standard deviations.
Column 4 in Table 5 studies the heterogeneous effects of the volatility in
yields according to the income group. The coefficient on volatility in yields
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is not identical for the three income groups, as confirmed by the Wald test
of joint significance. The relationship between volatility in agricultural yields
and the spread of the epidemic exists for both the middle- and high-income
groups. These results suggest that the middle- and rich-income countries are
more vulnerable to crop shocks in the sense that their population reacts more
by engaging in risky behaviors when experiencing frequent fluctuations in agri-
cultural yields than do the agents living in low-income countries. The effect of
the income volatility is even higher in rich-income group than in middle-income
group. These findings confirm the prediction that controlling for income, the
higher the instability in crop revenues, the steeper is the growth in prevalence.
As in the pooled regression, the proxy for income turns out to be significant and
positive. However, income has a smaller impact on the path of the epidemic than
the instability in yields since the standardized regression coefficients for GDP,
instability in yields for middle-income countries and for high-income countries
are respectively 0.0082, 0.0138, 0.0369.
4.5 Some remarks on the control variables
The Dynamics of the Epidemic HIV prevalence is found as an increasing
and concave function of the past prevalence level.
To control for the flow of people leaving the prevalence rate, we collect the
number of reported AIDS cases by year provided by UNAIDS and WHO (2004).
Given that once the individuals develop AIDS, their remaining lifetime is about
one year, the number of death due to AIDS is approximated by the lag of
the number of AIDS declared. We divide it to the whole adult population to
have a rate of AIDS mortality over 1,000 adult people as any standard death
rate. However, AIDS death does not appear statistically significant in predicting
prevalence.
Since the epidemic is said to be generalized as soon as the rate of national
HIV prevalence exceeds 1 (UNAIDS 2006), we capture the persistence of the
epidemic in one country by including a variable equal to the number of years
since the epidemic became generalized. The estimations suggest that the more
persistent the epidemic in the country, the slower is the growth in prevalence.
Two interpretations of this result are proposed. First, this finding validates one
of our theoretical predictions stating that the risk taking of HIV-infection is
negatively related to the proportion of infected agents in the population. Here
we found that the duration of the epidemic influences its growth as if people
fear to become infected as the epidemic is spreading. Second, a complementary
interpretation is that the longer the period of time since the epidemic became
generalized, the more informed people are. Once generalized, the existence of
AIDS is hardly denied since it takes part of everyday life for most inhabitants
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who necessarily know someone who was or is infected. If the epidemic is gener-
alized during a long period of time, collective information induces safer practices
that in turn, slower its growth.
Literacy and urban population The interplay between the literacy rate and
the prevalence is found to be statistically significant and negative. The spread
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is slower in countries where the literacy rate is high,
suggesting that sensitization campaigns are more efficient when addressed to
educated people as shown in de Walque (2007). One additional interpretation
is that educated people hold potentially good jobs and have more to lose if they
become infected. In that sense, they are willing to invest more in self-protection.
In some estimations, the rate of urban population appears to influence nega-
tively the spread of the epidemic. The lower the rate of urbanization, the steeper
is the growth in HIV prevalence. As noted in the theoretical section, the rate
of urbanization could be considered as a proxy for the access to health care
facilities. A higher urbanization induces a lower cost of self-protection given
that living in urban areas offers a larger access to sensitization campaigns and
a wider condom availability.
Ethnicity, religion and prevalence For the ethnic diversity of the coun-
try, we refer to the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index from Roeder (2001)
that takes values from 0 to 1, 1 standing for the most fractionalized country
since this index reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals
belong to two different ethnic groups. Our estimations show that a high eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization index is associated with a reduced propagation of
the epidemic. A high ELF index might reduce the likelihood for the agents to
have a large and extended sexual network, if the latter is bound by the ethnic
belonging. Accordingly, a high ELF index would lead to a decrease in the num-
ber of sexual partners or in the size of each sexual network and then to a fall in
the propagation of the virus from one sexual network to another.
Related to this result, we get that religion takes a part in explaining HIV
prevalence at least in some of the specifications. By dividing the countries into
three groups according to their level of Christianity, the estimations suggest
that the countries where over half of the population is evangelized but where
church members are less than 60% of the population have a higher probability
of exhibiting a widespread epidemic than do more evangelized countries. The
second result is that countries at the bottom of this religion scale and those that
are very evangelized are not statistically different in terms of HIV propagation.
The intermediate countries are more affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic than
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the more evangelized countries (and more affected than the less evangelized
countries if we change the reference category).
5 Conclusion
To our knowledge, this analysis is the first attempt to link the incentives to adopt
risky sexual behaviors through the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic with the
economic instability. To establish this link, we built a simple theoretical model
and tested it using a panel of African countries.
The present study reaches three conclusions. First, the average level of
income is insufficient in predicting prevalence in the region. When introducing
measure of instability in GDP, wealth is devoid of predictive power and the
puzzle of the positive relationship between income and prevalence in Africa
is lifted. Second, our findings suggest that the instability in gross domestic
product per capita and in yields influence the spread of the epidemic. More
volatile economies reach higher levels of HIV prevalence. Third, the interactions
between macroeconomic instability and prevalence were investigated by income
group and it is shown that rich countries are more vulnerable to economic shocks
than their counterparts. In rich countries, volatility has a greater impact on the
path of the epidemic. This suggests that the high prevalence in the rich African
countries is due to their economic instability, instead of the level of economic
development as such.
We think that the impact of income instability on the incentives for self-
protection is the major and most appropriate channel through which instability
affects the HIV prevalence. The argument behind is that experiencing frequent
and large fluctuations in national income and in yields reduces the opportunity
cost of infection, makes people consider the risk of HIV-infection as a minor
risk and hence leads to a rise in the incentives to adopt risky sexual behaviors.
In the paper, alternative channels (trade openness, conflict and aid flows) are
explored and are rejected by the data.
The limitations of this study are mainly due to the dataset. We used macroe-
conomic data while microeconomic data would have been more appealing to
directly predict the individual behaviors toward the risk of infection. Neverthe-
less as far as we know, no database mixing sexual behaviors and time series of
revenue is available. In a macroeconomic setting, we are not able to control for
a wide range of variables because of multicollinearity issues.
The paper is based on the central hypothesis that nowadays, HIV-infection
is a matter of choice and incentives. Of course, not all African people have per-
fect knowledge about the risk of HIV-contamination, about how to use condom
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properly and some individuals, particularly women, have no power to negoti-
ate on sexuality issues. However previous studies show that even well-informed
agents are engaging deliberately in risky sexual attitudes. As a policy implica-
tion, the conclusions of the paper promote the protection of the agents against
income shocks as a way to enhance their incentives to invest in self-protection
and take care of their health status in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In this paper, we examined the particular case of individual decision about
self-protection against AIDS but the bottom line may apply to other investments
in health care. In particular, it is possible to derive and test the same framework
for individual’s or household’s decision to use mosquito nets, to filter water or
to opt for vaccination in Africa. In these cases also, the agents do not massively
opt for self-protection even though the cost of self-protection is low and the
agents are informed about the health risks.
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Figure A and B: Income distribution for a couple of comparison countries
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Table 1a: National measure of the instability in constant GDP per
capita and in agricultural yields
Countries StdshockGDP Stdshockyields Countries StdshockGD Stdshockyields
Angola - 58.459 Liberia 67.746 53.342
Benin 22.325 48.044 Madagascar 17.744 40.898
Bostwana 170.993 43.807 Malawi 29.636 213.421
Burkinafaso 20.456 64.735 Mali 33.323 98.273
Burundi 40.973 40.199 Mauritania 30.201 75.738
Cameroon 83.228 87.021 Mozambique 51.812 75.474
Central Africa 33.932 75.681 Namibia 174.567 82.870
Chad 32.141 73.9216 Niger 37.579 47.577
Congo 199.016 64.675 Nigeria 29.880 100.507
Coˆte d’Ivoire 71.190 74.381 Rwanda 79.871 104.219
RDC 43.497 11.797 Senegal 45.297 79.229
Djibouti 253.008 104.014 Sierraleone 41.220 65.857
Equ. Guinea 321.186 - Somalia 44.184 -
Eritrea 27.573 212.697 South Africa 94.870 390.427
Ethiopia 24.630 99.006 Sudan 32.786 99.065
Gabon 315.335 91.558 Swaziland 133.303 276.695
Gambia 22.006 71.968 Togo 34.035 65.378
Ghana 36.035 81.816 Uganda 23.267 127.235
Guinea 46.949 37.291 Tanzania 38.900 125.639
Guinea Bissau 59.000 87.911 Zambia 39.097 312.449
Kenya 21.703 162.859 Zimbabwe 195.204 368.227
Lesotho 35.691 140.779
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Table 1b: Data definition and sources
Variable Definition Source
HIV Percentage of the adult population (15/49 years old) who UNAIDS
are currently living with HIV/AIDS
AIDS cases Declared cases of AIDS UNAIDS, WHO
Experience Number of years since the epidemic is generalized
yields Cereal yields: kg per hectare of harvested land WDI (2005)
cgdppc Gross domestic Product per capita in purchasing power Penn World Table, Version 6.2
parity, in I$ in 2000 Constant Prices (chain series)
urbanpop Percentage of the population living in urban areas WDI (2005)
literacy Adult literacy rate WDI (2005)
ELF Ethnolinguistic fractionalization Index Roeder (2001)
Christ1 Countries with less than 50% of evangelized people World Christian Database
Christ2 Countries where over half of the population is Centre for the Study of Global
evangelized but church members are less than 60% Christianity, in Gordon Conwell
Christ3 Countries where church members represent at least 60% Theological Seminary
of the pop and with more than 95% of evangelized people
openness Ratio of exports and imports over GDP, % Penn World Table, Version 6.2
armed conflict Dummy variable for armed conflict occurring in the country Centre for Study of Civil War
aid Official development assistance and official aid, current US$ WDI (2005)
aidpc Aid over the midyear population estimate, current US$ WDI (2005)
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Table 1c: Panel Unit root tests
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root
tests are based on the equation ∆yit = αi + ρiyit−1 + γit + εit,∀i,∀t where
∆yit = yit − yit−1, yit−1 is the lagged dependent variable, αi the individual
effect, t the time effect and εit the disturbances. The null hypothesis H0 is
the presence of unit root, i.e. ρi = 0. When the null is not rejected by the
data in levels, we apply the test to the data in first differences. If, even in
first differences, the process is not stationary, the test is done on the variable in
second differences.
In Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), the autoregressive coefficient is homogeneous
such that ρi = ρ,∀i while in Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), the coefficient is
allowed to vary across individuals.
We apply both tests in two specifications: one including individual effects
but excluding time trend and the other including both time trend and individual
effects. The conclusions are robust to the specifications. When we reject the null
of unit root under the model with individual effects, we reject it also under the
model with both time and individual effects. For the sake of clarity, the table
below reports only the results from the specification assuming both effects.
Levels First Differences Second Differences
Variables LLC IPS LLC IPS LLC IPS
HIV -32.39*** -24.88***
yields -4.95*** -4.43***
cgdp p.c. -1.05 0.65 -20.54*** -15.95***
AIDS death -0.49 1.48 -5.25*** -9.21***
urbanpop -1.83*** 9.94 -0.63 1.30 -9.76*** -9.27***
literacy 0.46 8.51 2.38 0.85 -0.52 -5.07***
openness (current) -2.08314** -1.85729**
openness (constant) -0.00336 0.3052 -9.58159*** -9.44538***
ODA 2.47 4.22 -5.46*** -7.03***
ODA p.c. 2.33 4.006 -8.16*** -7.07***
Note: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respec-
tively.
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Table 1d: Pairwise Granger Causality tests
F-Statistic Probability Obs
HIV does not Granger cause GDP p.c. 1.71492 0.18062 828
HIV does not Granger cause shock in GDP 0.26685 0.76586 828
HIV does not Granger cause shock in yields 0.40494 0.66716 793
Note: Lag length =2
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Table 3: Volatility in GDP p.c. and prevalence
(1) (2)=(1)+time trend (3)=(2)+ covariates (4)=(3) by income group
β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value)
L.hiv 1.1044*** (.041) 1.1467*** (.035) 1.3404*** (.067) 1.3446*** (.060)
L.hivsquared -.0026** (.001) -.0033*** (.001) -.0084*** (.002) -.0086*** (.002)
cgdpc .0003 (.0002) .0006*** (.0001) .0003 (.0002) 4.175e-06 (.0002)
stdshockGDP .0035* (.002) .0029** (.001) .0035*** (.001)
stdshockGDPlow -.0067 (.005)
stdshockGDPmiddle -.0020 (.002)
stdshockGDPhigh .0023** (.001)
urbanpop -.1333 (.091) -.1755** (.074)
literacy -.0585*** (.023) -.0441*** (.014)
elf -1.1601** (.503) -1.1562*** (.399)
christ1 -.2032 (.333) .0012 (.255)
christ2 .2708 (.216) .3177* (.182)
experience -.2005*** (.038) -.1874*** (.033)
AIDSdeath .1335 (.183) .1244 (.184)
constant -.0248 .179 -.8193*** .300 1.5093*** (.571) 1.6054*** (.506)
AR(1) test 2.61*** 2.27** 2.24** 2.26**
AR(2) test 3.44*** 3.50*** 2.82*** 3.05***
Hansen test 30.97 29.23 18.31 3.93
Observation 870 870 621 621
Instrumented L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq, S.cgdp
Hausman test chi2(4)=3.98 chi2(24)=0.54 chi2(30) =0.12 chi2(30)=119.36***
Wald test of jointly equal chi2(2)=6.27**
Wald test of jointly equal to 0 chi2(3)=13.45***
Note: Same as in table 2
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Table 4: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3)
Openness, current Openness, constant Average Openness, constant
β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value)
L.hiv 1.3427*** (.063) 1.3404*** (.067) 1.3426*** (.064)
L.hivsquared -.0086*** (.002) -.0084*** (.002) -.0085*** (.002)
cgdpc .0003 (.0002) .0004 (.0002) .0002 (.0002)
stdshockGDP .0028** (.001) .0035*** (.001) .0027* (.001)
openness .0042 (.003) .0003 (.002) .0039* (.002)
urbanpop -.1520* (.087) -.1339 (.091) -.1136 (.085)
literacy -.0554** (.022) -.0587*** (.022) -.0594*** (.023)
elf -1.0930** (.439) -1.1599** (.503) -1.0865** (.440)
christ1 -.1403 (.336) -.2021 (.332) -.2163 (.337)
christ2 .3246 (.229) .2714 (.216) .2718 (.225)
experience -.1898*** (.036) -.2004*** (.038) -.1914*** (.035)
AIDSdeath .0956 (.186) .1343 (.183) .1114 (.185)
constant 1.0686* (.619) 1.5073*** (.571) 1.1449** (.569)
AR(1) test 2.30** 2.24** 2.29**
AR(2) test 2.85*** 2.80*** 2.86***
Hansen test 17.80 13.86 18.45
observation 621 621 621
instrumented L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq
Hausman test chi2(30)=2.98 chi2(31)=8.34 chi2(31)=2.72
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Table 4: Robustness Checks (continued)
4 5 6
Conflict Total aid flows Aid flows p.c.
β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value)
L.hiv 1.3305*** (.066) 1.3376*** (.067) 1.3383*** (.067)
L.hivsquared -.0082*** (.002) -.0083*** (.002) -.0083*** (.002)
cgdpc .0003 (.0002) .0004 (.0002) .0004 (.0002)
stdshockGDP .0034*** (.001) .0036*** (.001) .0036*** (.001)
armed conflict -.3230*** (.121)
total aid flows 2.316e-10* (1.192e-10)
aid flows p.c. -.0004 (.002)
urbanpop -.1485* (.086) -.1481* (.090) -.1494* (.089)
literacy -.0552** (.022) -.0598*** (.023) -.0595** (.023)
elf -1.1883** (.479) -1.1433** (.502) -1.1360** (.500)
christ1 -.1649 (.339) -.1722 (.337) -.1752 (.338)
christ2 .2481 (.217) .2603 (.221) .2591 (.219)
experience -.1946*** (.037) -.1978*** (.038) -.1981*** (.038)
AIDSdeath .1335 (.172) .1435 (.184) .1367 (.184)
constant 1.6444*** (.578) 1.4848** (.582) 1.4947** (.581)
AR(1) test 1.97** 2.10** 2.19**
AR(2) test 2.83*** 2.79*** 2.73***
Hansen test 19.46 14.00 14.08
observation 621 605 605
instrumented L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq
Hausman test chi2(31)=19.57 chi2(29)=6.93 chi2(31)=1.55
Note: same as in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) include the degree of openness in current and constant
terms respectively. Column (3) includes the average of openness in constant terms over the period.
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Table 5: Volatility in yields and prevalence
(1) (2)=(1)+time trend (3)=(2)+covariates (4)=(3) by income gp
β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value)
L.hiv 1.0891*** (.036) 1.1216*** (.035) 1.3171*** (.066) 1.3413*** (.063)
L.hivsquared -.0023** (.001) -.0027*** (.0009) -.0079*** (.002) -.0086*** (.002)
cgdpc .0002 (.0001) .0005** (.0002) .0005** (.0002) .0004** (.0002)
stdshockyields .0030*** (.001) .0027** (.001) .0025** (.001)
stdshockyieldslow -.0014 (.001)
stdshockyieldsmiddle .0016* (.001)
stdshockyieldshigh .0027** (.001)
urbanpop -.0458 (.070) -.1332 (.089)
literacy -.0358* (.019) -.0411** (.018)
elf -1.4038*** (.433) -1.1080** (.469)
christ1 -.1987 (.277) -.1128 (.264)
christ2 .3504* (.185) .3282 (.202)
experience -.1923*** (.036) -.1916*** (.033)
AIDSdeath .3080* (.162) .2269 (.156)
constant -.0488 (.117) -.8707*** (.247) 1.5345*** (.505) 1.4760*** (.469)
AR(1) test 2.65*** 2.47** 2.05** 1.96**
AR(2) test 3.32*** 3.40*** 2.98*** 2.82***
Hansen test 36.85 28.79 12.77 8.68
observation 828 828 617 617
instrumented L.hiv, L.hivsq, S.cgdp L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq L.hiv, L.hivsq
Hausman test chi2(4)=40.55*** chi2(24)=0.32 chi2(29)=8.38 chi2(31)=1.98
Wald test of jointly equal chi2(2)=17.61***
Wald test of jointly equal to 0 chi2(3)=20.84***
Note: same as in Table 2
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